Considering a sequence of independent and identically distributed (IID) replications of a gamble that is initially rejected, Samuelson (1963) famously demonstrates the "fallacy of large numbers" in a situation involving the summation of risks. As Ross (1999, p. 324) remarks, "Samuelson points out that the law of large numbers applies to averages and not to sums". Samuelson (1963) also notes that a situation that involves summing risks corresponds to an insurance company pooling many risks together. Finally, Samuelson (1963) emphasizes that it is not sufficient to merely consider the probability of loss (which is typically decreasing when the number of IID risks increases). Instead, it is the expected utility of wealth that is central to the evaluation.
In this paper, we examine the position of a potential buyer of an insurance contract instead of the position of an insurance company. Using only standard assumptions, we are able to demonstrate that risk pooling (on the side of the insurance company) is beneficial for the (potential) insured in terms of expected utility.
Embedding a risk in a collective consisting of n IID risks means that a single risk has a share of 1/n of the collective risk. Thus, it is indeed the law of large numbers (LLN) that is central to this effect 1 . We conclude that pooling risks is fundamental to the decision of purchasing insurance because it favorably affects the utility position of potential insurance buyers (policyholders), and we denote this phenomenon the "utility-improving effect of risk pooling".
Pooling risks together is considered the essence of insurance, and numerous papers 2 have analyzed the effects of risk pooling 3 . However, research on the effects of risk pooling is typically performed from the perspective of the insurance company, i.e., the supply side.
Only recently have Gatzert and Schmeiser (2012) raised the question of whether risk pooling is also beneficial for policyholders, i.e., the demand side. However, they limit their analysis to a basic case (normally distributed claims, exponential utility function, mutual insurance) and do not perform a systematic analysis of the subject 4 . To the best of our knowledge, there are no further studies on the relevance of risk pooling from the perspective of potential 1 By contrast, when analyzing the summation of risks, it is the central limit theorem or (more generally) the theory of large deviations -see, e.g., Brockett (1983) and Hammarlid (2005) -that are central to the analysis. 2 For an excellent review of the corresponding literature, cf. Gatzert and Schmeiser (2012) . 3 However, these papers -in conformity with the common requirements of external regulation -are typically based on analyses of the probability of loss (probability of insolvency) and not on expected utility theory. 4 In addition, they do not apply the probabilistic techniques of the present paper.
buyers of insurance. Neither in the theory of insurance demand 5 nor in the wider field of insurance economics 6 has this aspect of risk pooling attracted attention.
Related to the literature that addresses the effects of risk pooling from the perspective of the insurer is the strand of literature 7 that analyzes sequences of gambles in the tradition of Samuelson. However, the latter addresses a scenario (summation of risks instead of averages of risks; the default call, which is considered in section III, is not taken into account; nor is the legal form of the insurance company or the premium calculation principle applied) that differs from that analyzed in the present paper.
I. The Basic Decision Situation
We consider a decision maker that possesses an initial (t = 0) amount of wealth W 0 . The potential accumulated claim X ≥ 0 in t = 1 from a certain type of insurance is the basic random variable considered. If we assume a risk-free interest rate of r = 0 (interest is ignored)
and that the decision maker does not buy insurance protection, the resulting end-of-period
The alternative is to buy insurance protection for an individual premium 9 π (π ≤ W 0 ). To simplify 10 the scenario, we assume that full coverage is available so that we do not have to make a distinction between the original claim and the indemnity. We assume that the risk X can be embedded in an IID collective of size n, i.e., in a homogeneous collective consisting of n independent risks 11 X i (i = 1,…, n), X i ~ (IID)X. With respect to X, we assume that the parameters of the distribution of X are known 12 and that the expected value E(X) is finite 13 .
5 See the recent review of Schlesinger (2013) . 6 See, for example, the Handbook of Insurance edited by Dionne (2013) . 7 Most notably, Diamond (1984) , Nielsen (1985) , Lippman and Mamer (1988) , Hellwig (1995) , Ross (1999) and Hammarlid (2005) . 8 We therefore ignore any additional insurable or non-insurable risks of the decision maker, particularly background risk -see Schlesinger (2013, pp. 180 ff.) -as well as any additional income (labor income, investment income, and/or pension claims). 9 Understood as the total premium (including expenses and the profit margin), in contrast with the pure risk premium (premium for the risk transfer). 10 This assumption is not a restriction. Defining Y = h(X) as the insured part of the original risk X, the corresponding analysis must be based on Y. 11 To keep the notation simple, we assume that the original risk X now corresponds to one of the risks X i . 12 Thus, we ignore parameter uncertainty.
In addition, we make the simplifying assumption that the IID-collective is the total collective of the insurance company because in this situation, the risk capital as well as the losses and gains of the company can be uniquely attributed to that collective.
The resulting end-of-period wealth (t = 1) in the case of purchasing insurance protection is W I (n). This position depends on additional factors (the legal form of the insurance company and the applied premium principle), and its concrete specification therefore has to be postponed.
The evaluation of the alternative wealth positions is performed in an expected utility framework; i.e., depending on the utility function, u(x), we have
According to (2b), the expected utility of the insured position depends, in particular, on the size of the IID collective in which the risk X is embedded.
With respect to the utility function, we initially make only standard assumptions. We assume that the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly concave. These assumptions ensure the continuity 14 of the utility function and the existence of the inverse function u -1 , which again is strictly increasing. In addition, we make the normalization u(0) = 0. Moreover, as any concave function is dominated from above by an affine function, the existence of E(X) ensures the existence of E[u(X)] in the sense of Klenke (2014, Definition 4.7) , i.e., as an extended real number in the domain [-∞, ∞) . This property carries over to the quantities
With respect to the utility effects of pooling risks, we consider two versions. The first ("strong") version requires that the expected utility of the corresponding wealth position be strictly increasing in the size of the collective. The second ("weak") version does not require the effects to be strictly monotone.
In the strong version, we require the following two conditions for a utility-improving effect of risk pooling:
Condition (3a) indicates that merely embedding the risk in an IID collective of size two already leads to an improvement in expected utility, and that purchasing insurance will be preferred. In addition, we require that the improvement in expected utility strictly increases with the size of the collective.
In the weak version, purchasing insurance, i.e., embedding the risk in an IID collective, is beneficial for the decision maker if there exists a size n 0 of the collective with
for all n ≥ n 0 .
Stating (4a) A utility-improving effect from increasing the size of the collective holds in the weak version if for all n ≥ n 0 , there is a collective size k n > n with
The existence of a limit lim n→∞ Φ I (n) > Φ NI or, equivalently, a limit lim n→∞ CE I (n) > CE NI obviously ensures the fulfillment of condition (4b) as well.
Condition (4a) indicates that for a given risk X and a given utility function u(x) there exists an IID collective X i ~ (IID)X of a minimum size n 0 , such that transferring the risk to the insurer will always be beneficial to a decision maker with utility function u. Condition (4b) indicates that embedding the risk in a (sufficiently) larger collective leads to an additional improvement in expected utility.
In both versions, the possibility of embedding a risk (considered to be transferred to an insurance company) in an IID collective ensures that purchasing insurance is (at least ultimately) utility improving.
II. Pure Mutual Insurance
In the case of pure mutual insurance, the policyholders are also the owners of the insurance company. Thus, policyholders have to participate in the company's profits and losses. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the insurance company is able to distribute possible profits and losses completely 15 . With a homogeneous collective, it is natural to assume that every policyholder will have an equal share of the profits and/or the losses of the collective 16 .
We let S n ≔ X 1 + … + X n denote the accumulated claim of the IID collective and S � n := S n /n represent the average accumulated claim per insured. If we assume that all members of the homogeneous collective are charged an identical individual premium π, the wealth position of the decision maker -whose risk is embedded in an IID collective of size n -is given by
In the case of pure mutual insurance, therefore, we have a special situation in which the wealth position of the insured is (under the specified assumptions) completely independent of the charged individual premium π. Because the policyholders have to take an equal share in all profits and losses, the amount of the premium becomes irrelevant.
We are now able to formulate our central result regarding the utility-improving effects of risk pooling in the case of pure mutual insurance.
THEOREM 1: The wealth position (5) in the case of pure mutual insurance fulfills the requirements (3) of a utility-improving effect of risk pooling for all potential buyers of insurance with a utility function that is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
This result is important not only from the perspective of the legal form of the insurance company. Modern insurance is rooted in mutual insurance, and the essence of mutual insurance is the notion that re-distributing risk in a collective is more beneficial than assuming the risk alone. Theorem 1 offers a utility-based justification of this classical notion.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the appendix. In the following, we sketch the main lines of the argument. The idea of Theorem 1 is to show that the wealth position W NI is "riskier" than W I (2) and that the positions W I (n) are in each case also "riskier" than the positions 15 Thus, we ignore taxes on profits as well as the possibility of increasing the reserves of the company. 16 Thus, we exclude the possibility that the insurance company is taking out a loan to finance the losses. W I (n+1). Here, "riskier" is understood as one of the equivalent versions (to be specific: Z = Y + "Noise") of the concept of "increasing risk" according to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) .
Defining Z = W I (n) and Y = W I (n+1), we obtain ε = S � n+1 -S � n as the relevant noise quantity.
Verifying the condition E(ε|Y) = 0 requires the evaluation of the quantities E(S � n |S � n+1 ). For this, we exploit the result that the sequence {S � n } is a backwards martingale 17 (also known as a reverse martingale).
Finally, we illustrate 18 the results of Theorem 1 by assuming normally distributed IID risks X i , i.e., X~N(μ, σ 2 ), and an exponential utility function, which is consistent with using the preference functional (a > 0)
We have Φ NI = Φ(W 0 -X) = E(W 0 -X) -a Var(W 0 -X), and therefore, on one hand, we
On the other hand, we have S � n ~ N(μ, σ 2 /n) and
Obviously, the relations Φ I (2) > Φ NI and Φ I (n + 1) > Φ I (n) for all n ≥ 2 are valid in this situation, which confirms the results of Theorem 1 in one special case (the combination of a distributional assumption, on the one hand, with an assumption regarding the utility function, on the other hand).
III. Stock Insurance Company

A. Basic Considerations
We consider an insurance company with an initial (t = 0) risk capital of amount C. The insurance company will become (technically) insolvent if S n > n π + C; i.e., the accumulated claim amount of the collective exceeds the sum of the accumulated premiums and the risk capital at hand.
As a consequence of insolvency, the resulting loss amount L n = max(S n -n π -C, 0) must be borne by the collective of the insured. Given this situation, we analyze two basic issues. First, we analyze the behavior of the relative loss 19 L � n = L n /n, i.e., the average loss per member of the IID collective. We have
From the perspective of a single insured, the quantity -L � n is of relevance, because the relative loss reduces the wealth position. This quantity can be regarded as a short position in a call option (a "default call"). Transferring the risk to a stock insurance company implies that (per capita) the policyholder takes a short position in this default call. The call option is defined relative to the average loss variable S � n and has an exercise price of amount π+ C/n.
As there exists no market in which average loss variables (and also absolute loss variables)
are traded and as it is not possible to generate the option on the basis of a self-financing dynamic trading strategy, we do not consider using arbitrage-free valuation techniques to price the option. Consistent with our general valuation approach, we value the call using expected utility theory.
In a second step, we consider the indemnity of the policyholder in case of (technical)
insolvency. In this case, we have to adjust the position of policyholder i in proportion to the amount of his loss X i . The resulting wealth position 20 is now
; i.e., on the level of the collective, we correctly obtain the loss L n that results from the insolvency of the insurance company. 19 Simultaneously, this equals the loss, which every policyholder must bear in the case of pure mutual insurance. 20 Obviously, there exists no elementary method to evaluate this position. Thus, we must resort to more fundamental probabilistic arguments. 21 We define X i /S n = 0 in the case of X i = 0. In the case of X i > 0, we have S n > 0, so there is no problem with the term X i /S n .
To simplify the following considerations, we additionally assume 22 X ≤ M< ∞ in this section, which indicates that the individual accumulated claim cannot be arbitrarily high.
From the perspective of a practical application, this assumption is not problematic.
This additional assumption is motivated by the fact that the proofs of the following theorems require the interchangeability of integration (calculating the expected value) and almost sure convergence. This requirement is assured by Lebesgue´s dominated convergence theorem 23 , which requires, in turn, the existence of an integrable dominating function.
However, a strictly concave utility function u cannot be bounded from below over an infinite In the remaining sections, we analyze the utility-improving effects of risk pooling by assuming two common alternative basic possibilities of setting the premium. 22 Concurrently, this is a standard assumption in the theory of insurance demand; see Schlesinger (2013, p. 168) . 23 See, for example, Klenke (2014, Corollary 6.26) . 24 See, for instance, Lippman and Mamer (1988) , who analyze sequences of gambles in the tradition of Samuelson. 25 Such an assumption is quite common. Föllmer and Schied (2011, p. 70 resp. p. 77), for example, make this assumption when analyzing the optimality of alternative insurance contracts resp. sequences of gambles.
B. Insurance Premiums Independent of the Size of the Collective
We first consider the case in which the individual insurance premium π is independent of the size n of the IID collective of policyholders. We disaggregate the individual premium in the form π = μ + l, where l denotes the loading to the net risk premium μ = E(X), making the standard assumption l ≥ 0. Loading l consists of a safety loading, on the one hand, and a loading for expenses, on the other.
As our first result, we obtain:
THEOREM 2: Considering a stock insurance company and an individual premium
, which is independent of the size of the IID collective insured, we obtain E�u�-L � n �� → 0 for n → ∞ under the assumptions specified 26 .
Thus, on a per capita basis, the value (in expected utility terms) of the short position in the default call, i.e., the "disutility" implied by the potential default of the insurance company, converges to zero when the size of the IID collective grows beyond all limits. If the risk to be transferred to the insurance company can be embedded in an IID collective of sufficient size, the possibility of the default of the insurance company (on average) is no longer relevant to the decision to purchase insurance.
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in the appendix. In the following, we present the main lines of argument. From the strong LLN, we first have lim n→∞ S � n = μ almost surely (a.s.).
Applying continuity arguments, we then obtain -L � n → 0 a.s. and therefore also u�-L � n �→ u(0)= 0 a.s. In the next step, we have to show the relation E�u�-L � n ��→ E[u(0)] .
This step, however, is not trivial because it is well known that almost sure convergence does not imply 27,28 convergence in expectation (resp. L 1 -convergence). To prove the necessary convergence relation, we identify a dominating function that enables us to use Lebesgue´s dominated convergence theorem. The appendix contains additional details.
We now evaluate the wealth position (10). The requirement l < Δ implies a restriction with respect to the amount of the premium, π, charged. Only if this restriction is valid does the possibility of pooling risk on the side of the insurance company remain beneficial for the potential buyer of insurance protection. An additional increase in the individual premium reduces the probability of insolvency and favorably influences the value of the default call max (S � n -π -C/n, 0). However, with respect to the total utility of the position (10), this effect is overcompensated by the negative effect of a higher premium π, which indicates that the pooling of risks is no longer beneficial in the case in which the insurance premium is "too high".
A case of special interest is l = 0 (zero loading); i.e., the premium corresponds to the expected claim amount (actuarially fair premium), π = μ. In this case 30 , the probability of insolvency of the insurance company is P(S n > n μ) = P[(S n -n μ)/(σ/√n) > 0). From the Central Limit Theorem, we obtain that this probability converges to (N denotes the distribution function of the standard normal distribution) 1 -N(0) = ½ for n → ∞. Therefore, 29 According to our assumptions, the utility function u(x) is strictly concave. Assuming that the random variable X is not degenerated (not a constant quantity), we employ Jensen´s inequality to ensure that the safety equivalent is strictly less than the expected value. 30 Making the additional simplifying assumption C = 0. the probability of insolvency does not converge to zero for IID collectives growing in size beyond all limits but "stabilizes" near ½.
Intuitively, we may conjecture that this result is relevant for the evaluation of the wealth positions (9) and (10) of the potential buyer of insurance protection, because the preceding result may have an influence on the value of the default call L � n = max(S � n -π, 0) = max(S n -n µ, 0)/n. However, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 (for l = 0, the condition l < ∆ is obviously valid) demonstrate that this conjecture is not true when the wealth positions are evaluated using expected utility. This result clearly shows that the probability of insolvency of the insurance company, on the one hand, and the expected utility of the wealth positions (9) and (10) To simplify the analysis 31 , we assume that the premium is actuarially fair, π = μ; i.e., the premium corresponds to the net risk premium (expected claim amount) and, in addition, a risk capital of amount zero, i.e., C = 0. According to section 2 of the online appendix, we are strictly decreasing with n, which confirms the conclusion of Theorem 2 for this special
In addition, this result confirms the preceding general analysis, according to which in the case π = μ as well, there is a utility-improving effect of risk pooling for the potential buyer of insurance.
At the same time, this result shows that the assumption of a finite domain of X can be dispensed with in special constellations. This is particularly the case when X is normally distributed, as expected utility then ultimately only depends on the expected value and the variance of the quantity to be evaluated.
C. Insurance Premiums Dependent on the Size of the Collective
Smith and Kane (1994) and Gatzert and Schmeiser (2012) distinguish between two effects of pooling risks. In case B, the probability of insolvency is decreasing (in the limit to a value of zero) when the individual premium is fixed. In case A, the probability of insolvency is fixed at a tolerated level, and the resulting premium is decreasing (in the limit to the expected claim amount; i.e., the loading converges to zero) with the increasing size of the insured IID collective. In case A the risk-pooling effect of case B is "passed through" to the policyholders in the form of a premium reduction as long as the required safety level is ensured. The constellation of case B is analyzed in section III.B. In the present section, we analyze a situation corresponding to case A.
In case A, risk pooling leads to premiums that are subadditive. A utility theoretic analog is considered in Diamond (1984, pp. 405 ff.) 32 . According to Diamond, summing independent risks provides diversification when the premium per risk decreases.
In insurance mathematics, the property of subadditivity is regarded essential for calculating premiums 33 . Shaun Wang et al. (1997) , therefore, employ an axiomatic approach to characterizing insurance premiums in a competitive market setting. Their approach leads to a price functional of the Choquet type, which in turn implies subadditive premiums. Consistent with the preceding discussion, in the following, we consider an individual premium of the form
where l(n) ≥ 0 is a loading (per risk) that depends on the size of the IID collective 37 . In addition, we are demanding
In contrast to section III.B, the individual premium now depends on the size of the collective, i.e., π = π(n). 34 See, for example, Gatzert and Schmeiser (2012, p. 188, p. 190) . Borch (1982 Borch ( , p. 1295 previously stated the following: "If a competitive market is in equilibrium, values must be additive…". 35 Gollier (2013, p. 118) reports that transaction costs in the case of insurance markets are approximately 30% of the premium, which is significantly larger than in the case of financial markets. 36 A corresponding result for financial markets is obtained by Chateauneuf et al. (1996) . 37 This loading, for example, consists of a declining safety loading per insured, on the one hand (see, also, the following example), and regressive operating costs, on the other hand.
The result of Theorem 4 in our view is fundamental to the understanding of the beneficial aspects of risk pooling for the (potential) policyholders. Embedding the risk to be transferred in an IID collective that is large enough and charging a premium of the form (13) will always be preferable to not insuring the risk! We end our discussion with an illustrative example, again confining ourselves to the evaluation of the wealth position (9). We consider an IID collective of normally distributed risks in connection with the preference functional (6). To simplify the analysis, we assume C = 0 and ignore expenses. We now fix the level α (0 < α < 0,5) of the probability of insolvency, i.e., P(S n > nπ(n)) = α. Per definition, the quantity nπ(n) must be identical to the
(1-α)-quantile of the distribution of S n . Because S n is normally distributed, we therefore obtain the condition nπ(n) = E(S n ) + N 1-α σ(S n ) = nμ + N 1-α σ√n, where N 1-α denotes the
(1-α)-quantile of the standard normal distribution, which implies that the structure of the (individual) safety loading has the form (14) l(n) = N 1-α σ/√n.
Thus, the safety loading exhibits an inverse proportional relationship to the square root of the size of the collective.
Charging the premium π(n) = μ + l(n), we obtain
The functions h 1 (α) > 0 and h 2 (α) > 0 are strictly positive and depend only on the probability level α but do not depend on the size of the collective. This finding confirms the conclusion of Theorem 2 for this special case; because
38 As in the example from section III.B, the evaluation of position (9) requires the calculation of partial moments. The calculations are contained in the online appendix.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed the relevance of risk pooling on the side of the insurance company for potential buyers of an insurance contract. Risk pooling involves the possibility of embedding a risk that is considered to be transferred to an insurance company in a collective of independent and identically distributed risks (an "IID collective"). We distinguish the case of a pure mutual insurer from the case of a stock insurance company. In the latter, the policyholder is formally exposed to a short position in a "default call"; i.e., the policyholder has to include the effects of the insurance company's potential insolvency in his evaluation. In addition, the alternative basic possibilities of setting the premium (independent of or dependent on the size of the collective) are considered.
We assume that a potential customer of the insurance company evaluates his alternative wealth positions based on expected utility. On the basis of the strong law of large numbers and elementary probabilistic arguments, we are then able to demonstrate -making only standard assumptions with respect to the utility function and the claim distribution -that the pooling of risks on the side of the insurer is beneficial for the (potential) policyholder. In addition, sufficiently increasing the size of the IID collective leads to a further increase in utility.
Thus, we conclude that the possibility of risk pooling is essential to the decision to purchase insurance because it favorably affects the utility position of the potential buyer of insurance.
The utility-based analysis of embedding a risk that is considered to be transferred to an insurance company in a collective of risks demonstrates that insurance contracts exhibit significant differences compared to other financial products. This finding confirms the view 39 that "producing" insurance is based on a "production law" (i.e., pooling risks) sui generis.
39 See, for example, Gatzert and Schmeiser (2012, p. 184) .
Appendix: Proofs
Theorem 1:
We exploit the fact that the sequence {S � n ; n ≥ 1} is a backwards martingale (reverse martingale) 40 . From the foregoing, one can deduce 41 the validity of the following relation (n ≥ 1)
which is central to our proof. Because the information sets generated by {S n+1 } and {S � n+1 } are identical, we also have E(S � n |S � n+1 ) = S � n+1 for (n ≥ 1).
We now define Z ≔ W 0 -S � n and Y ≔ W 0 -S � n+1 . We then have Z = Y + ε with
Therefore, for all n ≥ 1, W 0 -S � n is "riskier" than W 0 -S � n+1 in the sense of the definition of Rothschild and (1970) , i.e., W 0 -S � n = (W 0 -S � n+1 ) + "Noise". Thus, we have
for all risk-averse decision makers, which corresponds to requirements (3).
Theorem 2:
We proceed from π = μ + l with l ≥ 0. The functions f(x) = max(x,0), g(x) = min(x,0) and u(x) are continuous. Thus, from S � n → μ almost surely (a.s.) and C/n → 0 (surely), we obtain -L � n = -max�S � n -μ -l -C n ⁄ , 0� = min�μ + l + C n ⁄ -S � n , 0�→ min(l,0) = 0 a.s. and, therefore, also u(-L � n ) → 0 a.s. With 0 ≤ X ≤ M, we have 0 ≤ S � n ≤ M, and therefore, we obtain -M < min�π + C n ⁄ -S � n ,0� ≤ 0. Altogether, given our assumptions, we obtain 
Theorem 3:
We follow the lines of the proof of Theorem 2. From S � n → μ a.s. and L � n → 0 a.s., we obtain W I (n)→W 0 -π a.s., where W I (n) = W 0 -π -(L � n S � n ⁄ )X i . Therefore, we also obtain u(W I (n))→ u(W 0 -π) a.s. In addition, we have -M < W I (n) ≤ W 0 -π < W 0 and therefore u(-M) ≤ u(W I (n)) ≤ u(W 0 ). Overall, we obtain on the basis of our assumptions that |u(W I (n))| ≤ max�u(W 0 ),|u(-M)|� < ∞. Thus, we have found a dominating integrable function, and therefore, we can apply Lebesgue´s dominated convergence theorem, so we are able to conclude that E[u(W I (n))]→E�u�W 0 -π�� = u(W 0 -π).
Theorem 4:
We proceed from π(n) = μ + l(n) with l(n) ≥ 0. The result L � n →0 a.s. of Theorem 2 holds as well in the case of L � n = max (S � n -π(n) -C/n,0). 
O.2 Actuarially Fair Premium
In Again, we have h 2 (α) > 0 for 0 < α < 0.5 (which is confirmed by a plot of the function).
